Barrier Slicing for Remote Software Trusting

<u>Ceccato Mariano¹, Mila Dalla Preda²,</u> Jasvir Nagra², Christian Collberg³, Paolo Tonella¹

¹Fondazione Bruno Kessler-IRST, Trento, Italy ²University of Trento, Italy ³University of Arizona, USA






- Problem definition
- Attack model
- Barrier slicing
- Preliminary results
- Future works



Problem definition

- Network application, that needs a services by the trusted party.
- Trusted party means to deliver the services only to clients that can be trustred.

- s: state of the program P
- m = f(s)
- k = g(m)
 = g(f(s))






Problem definition

P is a valid state: P A(s) = true

P is entrusted:

E(m) = true





Attack model

Attacker on untrusted host:

- Any dynamic/static analysis tool
- Any software (buggers, emulators, ...)
- Read/write any memory location, register, network message, file.


Attacks:

- Reverse engineer and direct code change.
- Runtime modification of the memory.
- Produce (possibly tampered) copies of P that run in parallel.
- Interception and change of network messages.



Hardware based attestation


- Special hardware (TPM) is used to measure the state of the platform during the boot process.
 - Difficult to update
 - Costly
- Malicious code is detected because it causes measurements to deviate from the expected values.





Software based attestation


- Software based primitive to verify code execution on an un-trusted host
 - It can be updated.
 - No special purpose hardware is required.
 - It provides run-time attestation.
- It is based on
 - Challenge-response protocol.
 - Predictable checker execution time.









- A tampered program is running.
- The attacker computes the checksum on a correct copy.
- This attacks requires a small execution time overhead.
 - Accurate execution time prediction is mandatory to reveal this attack.





- There is a limited status (set of program variables) in an application that we are interested in protecting.
- A sub-portion of this state $(s_{\mid \text{safe}})$ can not modified by the user, otherwise
 - The client would receive a not-usable service or
 - The server would notice it





Continuity musting

- $\hat{s}_{|safe}$ is sent:
- $A_{safe}(\hat{s}_{|safe}) = false$,
- tampering is detected

 $s_{|safe}$ (!= $\hat{s}_{|safe}$) is sent:


- $A_{safe}(s_{|safe}) = true$,
- Service is not usable
- Tampering is useless

$$\hat{s} = \hat{s}_{|safe} \cup \hat{s}_{|unsafe}$$

$$B_{\epsilon} A(s) = A_{safe}(s_{|safe}) \wedge A_{unsafe}(s_{|unsafe})$$
















20/6/2007




Program slice

1	time2 = System. <i>currentTimeMillis</i> ();
2	double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
3	x = x + delta * cos(direction);
4	y = y + delta * sin(direction);
5	Server.sendPosition(x,y);
6	if (track.isInBox(x,y)){
7	gas = maxGas;
8	lastFuel = time2;
9	}
10	else {
11	ga <u>s = maxG</u> as - (int) (time2-lastFuel)
12	if (gas < 0) {
13	aas = 0;
14	if (speed > maxSpeed /10)
15	speed = maxSpeed /10;
16	else if (speed < minSpeed/10)
17	speed = minSpeed/10;
	}
	}
18	time = time2;



Program slice



slice(speed, 18) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17}

20/6/2007




Barrier slicing

speed

gas


Y

X





Barrier slicing



slice(speed, 18) =						
{1, 2, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17}						

20/6/2007



Client transformation 1

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
x = x + delta * cos(direction);
y = y + delta * sin(direction);
Server.sendPosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    gas = maxGas;
    lastFuel = time2;
else {
    gas = maxGas - (int) (time2-lastFuel);
    if (qas < 0) {
           qas = 0;
           if (speed > maxSpeed /10)
                      speed = maxSpeed /10;
           else if (speed < minSpeed/10)
                      speed = minSpeed/10;
time = time2:
```

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
x = x + delta * cos(direction);
y = y + delta * sin(direction);
Server.sendPosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    sync();
    lastFuel = time2:
else {
    sync();
    if (gas < 0) {
           sync();
           if (speed > maxSpeed /10)
                      sync();
           else if (speed < minSpeed/10)
                      sync();
```

```
time = time2;
```



Client transformation 2

time2 = System.currentTimeMillis(); **double** delta = speed * (time2 - time); x = x + delta * cos(direction); y = y + delta * sin(direction); Server.sendPosition(x,y); if (track.isInBox(x, y)){ sync(); lastFuel = time2: else { sync(); **if** (qas < 0) { sync(); if (speed > maxSpeed /10) sync(); else if (speed < minSpeed/10) sync(); time = time2:

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
x = x + delta * cos(direction);
y = y + delta * sin(direction);
Server.sendPosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    sync( );
    lastFuel = time2:
else {
    sync();
    if (ask("qas") < 0) {
           sync();
           if (ask("speed") > maxSpeed /10)
                       sync();
           else if (ask("speed") <minSpeed/10)
                       sync();
```

```
time = time2;
```

20/6/2007



Server transformation

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
client.receivePosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    gas = maxGas;
    lastFuel = time2:
}
else {
    gas = maxGas - (int) (time2-lastFuel);
    if (qas < 0) {
           gas = 0;
           if (speed > maxSpeed /10)
                      speed = maxSpeed /10;
           else if (speed < minSpeed/10)
                      speed = minSpeed/10;
    }
time = time2:
```

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
client.receivePosition(x,y);
if (A(x,y) == false)
    exit( "Tampering detected");
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    gas = maxGas;
    sync( );
    lastFuel = time2;
}
else {
    gas = maxGas - (int) (time2-lastFuel);
    sync();
    if (qas < 0) {
           qas = 0;
           sync();
           if (speed > maxSpeed /10) {
                      speed = maxSpeed /10;
                       sync( ); }
           else if (speed < minSpeed/10) {
                       speed = minSpeed/10;
                       sync( ); }
time = time2:
```



Optimizations:

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
x = x + delta * cos(direction);
y = y + delta * sin(direction);
Server.sendPosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    sync();
    lastFuel = time2;
else {
    sync();
    if (ask("gas") < 0) {
           sync():
           if (ask("speed") > maxSpeed /10)
                      sync( );
           else if (ask("speed") <minSpeed/10)
                      sync();
    }
time = time2;
```



Preliminary results

- CarRace game:
 - We moved the barrier slice on the server
 - Each time the client needs a value computed on the server, it asks for it from the server (communication overhead, delay).

Original client	Slice	Barrier slice
858	185	120 (-65%)
	22%	14% (-35%)

	Regular messages	Trust messaged	Increase
Sent	1174	5910	5.03
Received	1172	5910	5.04

20/6/2007





- Does the approach scale on a real size application?
 - Communication overhead.
 - Server overhead.
 - Identification of the security sensitive substate (s).
 - Identification of the already-protected sensitive sub-state (s_{|safe}).
 - Integration with other techniques.



Optimizations:

```
time2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
double delta = speed * (time2 - time);
x = x + delta * cos(direction);
y = y + delta * sin(direction);
Server.sendPosition(x,y);
if (track.isInBox(x, y)){
    sync();
    lastFuel = time2;
else {
    sync();
    if (ask("gas") < 0) {
           sync():
           if (ask("speed") > maxSpeed /10)
                      sync( );
           else if (ask("speed") <minSpeed/10)
                      sync();
    }
time = time2;
```