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human intervention secret sharing multiparty
computation homomorphic encryption *secure re-encryption*
uncomputable

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Outcome

- Project-wide Trust Model
 - Sufficiently Detailed: Comparison Possible
 - Sufficiently Open: No Solution Is Eliminated
 - Sufficiently Practical: Useful for builders
 - Sufficiently Theoretical: Useful for provers
 - Sufficiently Simple: No Time “Wasted”
- Fitting Existing Solutions
 - Trusted Slicing
 - WBRPE

Model Summary

RE-TRUST aims to preserve some set of properties of the set of all execution traces of a remote program.

Additional Properties:

- Confidential properties

- Prevent offline execution

- Amount of work performed by server

- Total work performed

Example Problem: Car Race Game

Attacker's Task:

Modify a particular variable

Attackers Property:

State trace of the program except for modification of a specific variable

Defenders Property:

State trace of a subset of variables

Additional Properties:

Server is scalable

Trace is not re-executable on new input

Example Problem: SETI

Attacker's Task:

- Return fake results

Attackers Property:

- State trace of the program except for modification of a specific variable

Defenders Property:

- State trace of a subset of variables

Additional Properties:

- The value of a key remains secret

Example Solutions

Slicing

Static Checksum

WBRPE

Maps from
execution trace
to state trace

Checksum on the
execution trace
implies static
checksum