Provably-secure WBRPE schemes

Amir Herzberg Haya Shulman

Bar Ilan university

Provably-secure WBRPE schemes:


Outline

- Reminder:
 - □ WBRPE
 - ☐ Why provably-secure solutions?
- Related works (provable secure)
- Provably-secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Based on Secure Function Evaluation: garbled circuits and Oblivious Transfer
 - Based on encrypted computation: homomorphic encryption $(E(x \lor y) = OR(E(x), E(y))$
- Conclusions



WBRPE: Components (Algorithms)

- Generator *G* : run by Trusted Party
 - \Box Generates key k (for local host)
 - ☐ And Obfuscated Virtual Machine OVM (for remote host)
- Encryption' (of program sent by local host)
- Decryption' (of result sent by remote host)





WBRPE: Goals and Results

- Reach comparable situation to cryptography:
- Provably secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ May not be practical (cf. [GM84, OTP])
- Practical, efficient, cryptanalysis-proven WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Secure by evidence of failed cryptanalysis, safety margins
- Results
 - ☐ Theoretical feasibility results (provably secure schemes)
 - □ Robust combiner: given two candidate WBRPE schemes, build one that is secure if one of the two candidate schemes is secure
 - Allows safety-margins in design



Why Provably-Secure Solutions?

- Most white-box security work is heuristic
- This talk focuses on provably-secure WBRPE
- Why is it interesting?
 - ☐ Theoretical interest: is it possible?
 - Doubts raised after presenting WBRPE defs
 - ☐ `Feasibility proof`
 - Encourages search for practical (heuristic?) schemes
 - ☐ Ideas for design of practical WBRPE schemes?



Related Works

- Secure multiparty/two-party computations [Yao, GMW,...]
- Secure function evaluation based on Yao's garbled circuits [Cachin, Camenisch, Kilian, Muller]
- Encrypted computing, based on homomorphic encryption [Sander, Young, Yung]
- More [see paper]

Provably-secure WBRPE schemes:

Outline

- Reminder:
 - □ WBRPE
 - ☐ Why provably-secure solutions?
- Related works (provable secure)
- Provably-secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Based on Secure Function Evaluation: garbled circuits and Oblivious Transfer
 - Tools
 - Design
 - □ Based on encrypted computation: homomorphic encryption $(E(x \lor y) = OR(E(x), E(y))$
- Conclusions




Cryptographic Tools: Garbled Circuit

- Yao's secure circuit evaluation protocol allows two parties with secret inputs each to evaluate poly-size Boolean circuit
- Represent f(',') as a Boolean circuit
- "garbling" of the circuit: replace every gate in the circuit with encrypted version of the gates
 - \square \forall wire, assign random strings representing 0/1
 - \square \forall gate, construct a "secure" garbled truth table
- At every step, the party evaluating the circuit, computes some function of its secret input and the encrypted value received from other party




Boolean OR Circuit:






Boolean OR Circuit:





Cryptographic Tools: Oblivious Transfer

- Can be based on most public-key systems
- The sender has two inputs, and the receiver wants to learn one of them, at the end of the protocol:
 - □ the receiver learns this input and nothing else
 - ☐ the sender should not learn which input this was




Provably-secure WBRPE schemes:

Outline

- Reminder:
 - □ WBRPE
 - ☐ Why provably-secure solutions?
- Related works (provable secure)
- Provably-secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Based on Secure Function Evaluation: garbled circuits and Oblivious Transfer
 - Tools
 - Design
 - □ Based on encrypted computation: homomorphic encryption $(E(x \lor y) = OR(E(x), E(y))$
- Conclusions



- To achieve privacy of both parties, use third party T
 - ☐ T generates garbled circuit, and random keys
 - □ Local receives output decryption tables, and random strings for P
 - ☐ Remote receives garbled tables




ŊΑ

WBRPE Based on Garbled Circuit

- To achieve privacy of b
 - ☐ T generates garbled circ
 - ☐ Local receives output d
 - □ Remote receives garble


```
\mathcal{G}(1^{k}, V) \{ (K_{P}, K_{a}) \leftarrow G_{E}(1^{k}) \\
\mathcal{U} \leftarrow createU(V) \\
K_{P} = ((K_{1,0}, K_{1,1}), ..., (K_{|P|,0}, K_{|P|,1})) \\
K_{a} = ((K_{1,0}, K_{1,1}), ..., (K_{|a|,0}, K_{|a|,1})) \\
\mathcal{U} \leftarrow Garble(U) \\
\text{return } (\mathcal{U}, K_{P}, K_{a}) \\
\}
```





- To achieve privacy of b
 - ☐ T generates garbled circ
 - ☐ Local receives output d
 - ☐ Remote receives gard


 $\mathcal{G}(1^{k}, V) \{ (K_{P}, K_{a}) \leftarrow G_{E}(1^{k}) \\
\mathcal{U} \leftarrow createU(V) \\
K = ((K_{1,0}, K_{1,1}), ..., (K_{|P|,0}, K_{|P|,1})) \\
a = ((K_{1,0}, K_{1,1}), ..., (K_{|a|,0}, K_{|a|,1})) \\
\mathcal{U} \leftarrow Garble(U) \\
\text{vrn} (\mathcal{U}, K_{P}, K_{a})$






- To achieve privacy of both parties, use third party T
 - □ T generates carbled circuit and random keys
 - □ Local
 - □ Remo
- Transfer $(x_i,(K_{i,0},K_{i,1}))$:
 - □ Interactive (1-2)OT protocol between local and remote for each wire of the circuit

d random strings for P






- To achieve privacy of both parties, use third party T
 - ☐ T generates garbled circuit, and random keys
 - □ Local receives output decryption tables, and random strings for P
 - □ Remote receives garbled tables



Ŋ.

WBRPE Based on Garbled Circuit: Properties

- Privacy of local and remote inputs
- Unforgeability: since remote only gets random strings corresponding to correct inputs, can't compute incorrect outputs
- \blacksquare Single program P; remote commits to a at generation





If Third Party is not Trusted...

- Cut-and-Choose:
 - □ Remote parses C into m garbled circuits, and sends them to Alice. Alice also parses C.
 - \square Alice chooses one circuit for evaluation \boldsymbol{C}
 - \square Bob exposes secrets of all garbled circuits except C
 - ☐ Alice verifies all exposed garbled circuits
 - □ Catches cheating with probability 1-1/m
- Bob sends his inputs for *C* (Alice can't interpret them because they are garbled)



Non-Interactive Encrypted Computation

- Computing with Encrypted Data (CED)
 - \square Local host has input x, remote has a function f
 - \square Local sends E(x) to remote
 - \square Remote computes E(f(x)) and sends to local
 - \square Local decrypts and learns f(x) in one-round protocol
- Computing with Encrypted Functions (CEF)
 - \square Local has a function f, remote has an input x
 - \square Local encrypts f an generates a program P(E(f))
 - \square Remote computes P(E(f))(x) and returns to local
 - \square Local decrypts P(E(f))(x) and obtains f(x)

Provably-secure WBRPE schemes:

Outline

- Reminder:
 - □ WBRPE
 - ☐ Why provably-secure solutions?
- Related works (provable secure)
- Provably-secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Based on Secure Function Evaluation: garbled circuits and Oblivious Transfer
 - Based on encrypted computation: homomorphic encryption $(E(x \lor y) = OR(E(x), E(y))$
- Conclusions




WBRPE Based on Encrypted Computation

- For circuits with limited depth
- Technique to securely evaluate circuit
 - ☐ Using probabilistic homomorphic encryption
 - ☐ Allowing efficient computation of NOT and OR gates for encrypted values:
 - $E(\sim a)=NOT(E(a))$,
 - \blacksquare E(a \square b) = OR(E(a), E(b))

100

WBRPE Based on Encrypted Computation


- To achieve privacy of both parties, use third party TTP
 - \Box TTP generates universal circuit U, and pair of keys (e,d)
 - $U(E_e(P), E_e(a)) = E_e(P(a))$ if V(P) = OK.
 - \square Local receives (e,d)
 - \square Remote U and e



NA.

WBRPE Based on Encrypted Computation

- To achieve privacy of both parties, use third party T
 - To active privacy of both parties, use tilled party I



24




WBRPE Based on Encrypted Computation

- \blacksquare TTP receives predicate V from remote and generates
 - \square Universal circuit U(P,a)=P(a) if V(P)=1
 - \square Keys (e,d)
- TTP sends
 - \square *U* and *e* to remote
 - \Box (e,d) to local
- Local sends to the remote host encryptions of each bit of the program, i.e. $c_p/i/=E_e(P_i)$
 - \square Remote host bit-wise encrypts $c_a = E_e(a)$, evaluates $w = U(c_p, c_a)$, and returns w to local
 - \square Local recovers y using d



Encrypted Computation WBRPE: Properties

- Privacy of local input *P*: since outputs are encrypted
- Privacy of remote input a: since U validates P with V
- Integrity? Local host sends `dummy computations`
- Efficiency?





WBRPE Based on Encrypted Computation

Efficiency?

- □ Expansion of the sizes of outputs relative to sizes of inputs
 - Worst case 8^{{circuit depth}}
 - For iterative applications required space and computation complexity grows exponentially with each step → only works for small circuits



Provably-Secure WBRPE: Conclusions

- Presented two provably-secure WBRPE schemes
 - ☐ Based on garbled circuits
 - For one program only, commit to a before generation
 - ☐ Based on homomorphic encryption
 - Only for programs encoded by polylog circuit
- Open questions
 - ☐ Better provably secure WBRPE schemes (e.g., arbitrary circuits)