Theory of Obfuscation and its practical applications Amir Herzberg and Haya Shulman

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What is Obfuscation? (Intuitively)

- A compiler; output is `obfuscated' program
 - Obfuscated program has same functionality as original, and similar performance
- Intuitive Security Goals:
 - Hide program
 - Hide secrets inside a program
 - Prevent modification of program
- Used to protect program running in untrusted PC:
 - DRM, eVoting, `trusted' TCP, policy enforcement, ...

Obfuscation: Theory vs. Practice

- Practice
 - Obfuscation widely used
 - Lots of skepticism: security, impossibility alike
- Theory
 - Precise definitions (several variants)
 - Impossibility results
 - Positive (possibility) results
 - Related tools
- This talk: review of theory and its applications

Theory of Obfuscation: Outline

- Introduction
- Definition: Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation
- Impossibility (negative) result
- Positive results and challenges
- Beyond black-box obfuscation
 - Non-malleability
 - Verifiable non-malleability
- Few related goals and tools
 - Public-key Obfuscation
 - WBRPE (White-Box Remote Program Execution)
- Conclusions and open questions

Definition: Virtual Black-Box Security [Barak et al., 2001]

- An obfuscator \mathcal{O} is an efficient compiler that on input *P* outputs $\mathcal{O}(P)$, such that:
 - Functionality:
 - For every P, $\mathcal{O}(P)$ computes the same function as P
 - Program $\mathcal{C}(P)$ is slightly slower (and larger) than P
 - Virtual Black-Box:
 - Whatever Adv can compute with obfuscated code *O*(*P*)
 - A `black-box Adv` BB can compute by only <u>calling</u> P

Adv(O(P))
$$\approx$$
 BB x P
P(x) P

Example: Obfuscating a Point Function [Canetti97]

- Point function $I_x(w) = \{1 \text{ if } w = x, 0 \text{ otherwise}\}$
- Obfuscate I_x with perfectly one-way function f
 Let y=f(x)
 Program ObfI_x (w):
 { if y=f(w) return 1 else return 0 }
- Intuitively: y=f(x) reveals no more info than black-box access to I_x

$$\mathsf{Adv}(f(x)) \approx \mathsf{Adv}(\mathsf{ObfI}_x) \approx \mathsf{BB} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{X}} f$$

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 { if y=f(w) return 1 else return 0 }
- Intuitively: y=f(x) reveals no more info than black-box access to I_x
- But: this is a <u>very</u> specific obfuscator...
- Is there general obfuscator (for all programs)?

Barak's Unobfuscatable Program

- Is there a general obfuscator (for all programs)?
- [Barak et al, 01] No!
- They present a <u>program</u> P that cannot be obfuscated
 - Hence: no obfuscator for <u>all</u> programs!
- First, they present <u>two</u> programs C, D and then transform it into P
- Let C, D be two programs specified by two secret strings (α,β)
 - Upon input x, $C_{\alpha\beta}$ returns β if x= α and returns 0 (of same length as β) otherwise
 - Upon input a program, D runs it with input α , and if the result is β , returns 1 otherwise 0

No Virtual Black-Box Compiler for Every Program

- Obfuscate C and D, to obtain $O(C_{\alpha\beta})$ on $O(D_{\alpha\beta})$
- Evaluating $O(C_{\alpha\beta})$ on $O(D_{\alpha\beta})$, always results in 1
- Black-box access to *C* and *D* is similar to blackbox access to *D* and some program that always returns 0



• To extend the impossibility to single program, define *P*=*D*(*C*)

No Virtual Black-Box Compiler for Every Program

- So: some programs that cannot be obfuscated according to virtual black box definition
- So what? Practical implication? Options:
 - Ignore…?
 - Consider alternative, e.g., weaker definitions
 - None so far?
 - Consider obfuscation of specific programs
 - Which? Few `positive results`...
 - E.g., point function obfuscation, re-encryption

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 - Public-key Obfuscation
 - Secure function evaluation (SFE) and Garbled Circuits
 - Cryptocomputing and homomorphic encryption
- Conclusions and open questions

Obfuscator for Shared-Key Encryption

- Let (E_K, D_K) be shared key encryption
- [Hofheinz, Malone-Lee, Stam07]: there exists obfuscatable encryption schemes

- $O(E_K)$ gives <u>public</u> key encryption!

- How? Let (E',D') be <u>public</u> key encryption
- Define shared key (E,D) scheme with key (e.d).
 (both keys of public key scheme)
- Then $O(E_{e,d}) = E'_{e}$ is obfuscation of (E,D)...

- But again, is this `real' obfuscator??

Challenge: Obfuscatable Program

- All `positive results` use trivial obfuscators
 - Based on properties of program
- Challenge: find programs $P = \{P_K\}$ s.t.:
 - Impossibility does <u>not</u> (seem to) hold for P
 - Yet, no `trivial' obfuscator for P
 - Preferably, non-trivial obfuscator e.g. one that may work for some other programs too...

Non-Malleable Obfuscation

- Ensure non-malleability of obfuscated program
 - Alice obfuscates a decryption algorithm which outputs the encrypted message only if certain conditions hold
 - Eve modifies the program to always output the result of decryption
- Goal: prevent modifications of the obfuscated programs

Verifiable Non-Malleable Obfuscation

- Obfuscation is verifiably non-malleable if the only programs attacker can create that pass verification are those it could create given black-box access to obfuscated code
- Allows to detect attacks that were not prevented
 - e.g., digitally sign obfuscated program, then verification procedure will check that the signature attached to the obfuscated program is correct
 - According to unforgebility property it is impossible to modify the program
 - How does the verification procedure obtains the verification key?
 - May not be practical

Public-Key Obfuscation

- Public-Key obfuscator is a pair of algorithms (Compile,D)
 - Use **Compile** to obfuscate secret program P, obtain O(P),K
 - The output is encryption of original program's output
 - Use **D** with K to recover result of O(P)(x) on some input x
 - Correctness: for any input x, D(C(x))=P(x)

Fin