

Tools and Methodologies for Layered, Diverse, and Renewable Security in Tethered Systems

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Cloakware, an Irdeto Company

Classification: Unrestricted

Outline

- Who is Cloakware?
- Applications & Security Risk
 - Example Application: Digital Rights Management
 - Security Risk
 - What are the Threats?
- Cloakware Build Tools
 - Traditional Build Flow
 - Cloakware Security Suite
 - Source and Binary Level Tools
- Threat Analysis
- Diversity
 - What is Diversity?
 - How Does Diversity Address the Security Lifecycle
 - Renewability, Revocation
- Conclusions & Future Work

Who is Cloakware ?

(Caution: a few marketing slides ahead)

Advancing Software Protection for Digital Assets

- 1997 Company founded
- 2003 Intel licenses Tamper Resistance Software to Cloakware
- 2007 Acquired by Irdeto Access
- 450+ person-years of development in core software protection technology
- Ottawa, Beijing, Washington, California, UK, Switzerland

Sample Customers

- 4 of the top 5 semiconductor manufacturers
- 3 of the top 5 mobile handset manufacturers
- 3 of the leading smart phone manufacturers
- 4 leading mobile telecom service providers
- 3 of the world's largest software companies
- 2 of the top 3 video card manufacturers
- 3 leading conditional access vendors

Technology Partners



Cloakware Lines of Business




Consumer Product Solutions

Software security toolkit
DRM client solutions



Enterprise

Privileged & application
password protection
Identity & access
management



Software Protection Technology

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Cloakware in the Digital Home



Content Providers

Internet
Cable
IPTV
Mobile/Sat

Digital TVs



Mobile Phones



Home NAS



Digital Media Adapters



PCs



Set Top Boxes



Portable Media Players



■ One billion+ protected applications deployed worldwide.


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Example Application

Digital Rights for High Value Content

Example Application: Digital Rights Management (DRM)

- Content and License distribution model



What is Security Risk?

- Multi-Factored Relationship

Threats



Vulnerabilities



Assets



How do your protection techniques address these?

What are the Threats?


Direct WhiteBox Attack




IDA Pro
HexRays
OlllyDbg
LordPE
GDB
HIEW
HexEdit
VMware
QEMU




Colluding Attack



Differential Attack



Exploit can Lead to Widespread Damage



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Cloakware Build Tools


Source & Binary Level

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Cloakware is Multi-Layered Protection



- Compiler Transformation Technology
- Intel Binary Tamper Resistance Technology
- WhiteBox Cryptography
- Flexible & Modular
 - Choose the Right Combination of Defenses




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Cloakware Security Suite



- Traditional Build Tools
 - + Source-Level Tools
 - The *Transcoder*
 - Key Hiding
 - Binary-Level Tools
 - Integrity Verification
 - Anti-Debug
 - Dynamic Code Decryption
 - Symbol Renaming
 - White-Box Cryptography
 - Libraries
 - Utilities
 - Librarian
 - Linker




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
Data-Flow Encoding Principle

cloakware
irdata


- Mathematical Mapping of Data Values
- Data Locations → Mapped
- Data Operations → Mapped
- Many Function Families
- Randomly Chosen Constants




Original Data Flow Graph



Data Transformations



Transformed Data Flow Graph




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Data Transforms: Dynamic Concealment

cloakware
irdata


- Data Values are Transformed in Memory
- Operations are Transformed
- Net Effect: Modified values at all intermediate stages

Illustration



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
Control Flow Flattening – Basic



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
Use Dominance Property to build History Chains

```
int function() {  
    int i;  
    for(i=0; i<10; i++) {  
        if(a[i] < b[i]) {  
            a[i] = b[i] + 7;  
        }  
        else {  
            a[i] = 0;  
        }  
    }  
    a[0] = 6;  
}
```



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
Control-Flow Flattening: History-Dependencies



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Control-Flow Flattening Advanced Features


- **Dummy Branches**
 - Insertion of non-obvious False Conditions that jump to wrong areas of the code
- **Constant Hiding**
 - Constants are hidden in Opaque Predicates



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WhiteBox Cryptography Ensures that keys are hidden


- White-box cryptography ensures the input data, keys and resulting output data are protected at all times
- WB-AES, WB-RSA, WB-ECC, WB-3DES



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Binary Technology Example: Integrity Verification

- Run-Time Verification of Build-Time Integrity
- Performance Trade-offs
 - Code Segment is partitioned for integrity checks
- Uses White Box Crypto
- Failure Modes
 - Hard Failures
 - Soft Failures




Other Binary Technologies

- Anti-Debug: Exception-Based, Signal-Based, Timing-Based
- Dynamic Code Decryption
- Secure Loader (Packer)

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Threat Analysis: Attack Tree

1. Identify and Prioritize Assets
2. Identify Possible Paths to Each Asset
3. Establish a Strategy for Layered Mitigation Techniques
4. Insert Protection Tools into a Flexible Build Environment
5. Explore Trade-offs (Security Tuning Cycle)



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
Diversity

Built into Cloakware Tools

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Diversity: Differing Construction

- Randomly Chosen:
 - Order & Layout
 - Function Families
 - Constants
- Seeded Build
 - Reproducibility
- Diverse Instances
 - Functionally Equivalent
 - Similar Performance
 - Structurally Differing
- Needle-in-a-Haystack Property



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Diversity Properties

- Uniformity
 - Showing a single form
 - Always the same
 - At regular intervals
- Diffusion
 - Statistical dissipation of information.
- Confusion
 - Complex dependencies.
- Self-Similarity
 - An object that is exactly or approximately similar to a part of itself
 - The whole has the same shape as one or more of the parts
 - *e.g. shorelines, fractals*

Koch Curve



Mandelbrot Set




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Software Diversity




- Diversity Generation – built into Cloakware Tools
- Each instance - must be attacked separately
- Dramatically increases the work to create an automated attack tool



Break the hacker business model

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
Diversity used across Client Base



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
Diversity used across Software Versions

• Common Scenario



Obvious Differential Attack

• Using Diversity



? Attack Point ?


- *Temporal Diversity*
- *Renewability*

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Attack Mitigation and Recovery

Deploying Software


- Strong attack response
- reduces duration of attack



Resulting Hacker Business Model

Hacker Business Model

- Tamper resistance
Raises cost of attack
- Diverse production
Reduces scope of attack




Software Diversity Benefits

- Minimize scope of attack -- Prevent automated attacks
- Provide rapid recovery in the event of an attack
- Make the business unattractive to the hacker

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
Data Interface Diversity

- Extending Data Transformations to Interfaces



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Revocation



Conclusions



- Threats on Distributed Systems
 - Direct Attacks, Collusion, Differential Attacks
- Cloakware Build Tools
 - Source and Binary Level Tools
 - Data & Control-Flow Transformations
 - White-Box Crypto
 - Integrity Verification, Anti-Debug, Dynamic Code Decryption
- Diversity
 - Properties: Uniformity, Diffusion, Confusion, Self-Similarity
 - Across Client-Base (Spatial)
 - From Version to Version (Temporal)
 - Renewability
 - Revocation

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Future Areas of Study



- Diversity Metrics and Measurement
- Active Monitoring and Breach Detection
 - Built-In Updatable Security
- Emulation Attacks
 - Examples: VMware, Virtual PC, QEMU, Bochs
- Code Lifting Attacks
- Hardware Anchoring
 - Node-Locking
 - Machine Fingerprinting
- Security Patterns

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