

Second year review WP2 overview SW-based Method


Trento - October 17th, 2008




Goal

- To investigate software-only methodologies for remote entrusting implementation


Tasks



Tasks



Tasks



Secure interlocking and authenticity checking

- Definition of software techniques to securely combine an application with different protection and authentication mechanisms

Secure interlocking and authenticity checking

- Remote Invariants Monitoring (POLITO)
- Remote Control-Flow Checking (POLITO)
- White-Box Remote Procedure Call (UNITN, KUL)
- Barrier Slicing (UNITN)

Secure interlocking and authenticity checking

- Remote Invariants Monitoring (POLITO)
- Remote Control-Flow Checking (POLITO)

Remote monitoring of program state, or program execution flow

Program traces sent from untrusted to trusted node

Secure interlocking and authenticity checking

Program execution through an obfuscated
virtual machine

Analysis of the application becomes not
possible

(POLITO)

- White-Box Remote Procedure Call
(UNITN, KUL)

- Barrier Slicing (UNITN)

Secure interlocking and authenticity checking

- Remote Invariants Monitoring


Portions of the application executed on a trusted node either local (smart card or secure hardware), or remote

- White-Box Remote Procedure Call

(UNITN, KOL)

- **Barrier Slicing (UNITN)**

Tasks



Dynamic replacement ^{T2.3}for increased tamper resistance

- Investigation of innovative methods exploiting the “time dimension” to increase tamper resistance

Dynamic replacement ^{T2.3}for

increased tamper resistance

- Remote Tamper-Resistance with Continuous Replacement (UNITN, POLITO, prof. Christian Collberg)
- Increased reverse engineering complexity through continuous replacement and mutant code (POLITO)
- Orthogonal replacement (UNITN)

Dynamic replacement ^{T2.3}for increased tamper resistance

- Remote Tamper-Resistance with Continuous Replacement (UNITN, POLITO, prof. Christian Collberg)

Program divided into blocks sent from the trusted node to the untrusted node

- The untrusted node never holds the complete application
- Each block obfuscated with different transformations including introduction of corrupted blocks

Implementation deployed on Java code

the trusted to the untrusted node and bound into the application through code mutations

- The untrusted node never holds the complete application
- Each block dynamically relocated during a single execution and over different executions (memory layout always different)

Implementation deployed on x86 binary code

- Increased reverse engineering complexity through continuous replacement and mutant code (POLITO)

- Orthogonal replacement (UNITN)


Dynamic replacement ^{T2.3}for increased tamper resistance

- Remote Tamper-Resistance with

A theoretical model to build different versions of a program and/or a program block in such a way that a given version does not provide information to reverse engineering future versions

- Orthogonal replacement (UNITN)

Tasks



Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection

- Definition of pure software solutions to increase reverse engineering complexity

Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection

- Crypto guards (KUL)
- Fuzzing (KUL)
- White-Box Cryptography (KUL)
- Obfuscation of Java byte code (GEM)
- Obfuscation Techniques (KUL)
- SProT (KUL)

Increased reverse

engineering complexity for

- Cryptoguards (KUL)
- ### software protection

- Fuzzing (KUL)

- White-Box Cryptography (KUL)

A technique to protect software against analysis and against tampering as well

Deployed on a binary level by using the
Diablo binary rewriter

Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection

- Cryptoguards (KUL)

- Fuzzing (KUL)

- White-Box Cryptography (KUL)

- Obfuscation of low-level byte code

Software testing technique

Submitting random or unexpected data to an application and monitoring it for any resulting error

STILL IN A PRELIMINARY PHASE

Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection

- Cryptoguards (KUL)
- Fuzzing (KUL)
- **White-Box Cryptography (KUL)**

- Obfuscation of Java byte code (GEM)

Deep analysis of state-of-the-art in WBC

Proposal of a secure encryption scheme, designed to be white-boxing

Java byte code obfuscation

- Layout obfuscation: debug information and identifier names removed
- Data obfuscation: the way data is stored and encoded changed
- Control flow obfuscation: the way the program runs changed (e.g., method invocation, loops, branches)
- Preventive obfuscation: identification of weakness in current de-obfuscation and de-compilers to make them crash or fail

● Obfuscation of Java byte code (GEM)

- Obfuscation Techniques (KUL)
- SProT (KUL)

Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection

Class containing control flow obfuscation techniques such as control flow graph flattening and opaque predicates

Implemented in Tx1 a code transformation language

- Obfuscation Techniques (KUL)

- Software Protection Tool - SProT (KUL)

Increased reverse engineering complexity for software protection


- Crypto guards (KUL)

Several analysis resistance and tamper resistance techniques integrated into a single tool

- WBC be means of white-box DES and white-box AES • Obfuscation techniques • Crypto Guards

- Software Protection Tool - SProT (KUL)

Tasks



Design of entrusting protocol

- Cryptographic and synchronization concerns of the communication protocol employed between trusted and untrusted node

Design of entrusting protocol

- Preliminary design of the entrusting protocol (SPIIRAS)
- Analysis of the entrusting protocol (SPIIRAS)

Design of


Broad analysis of existing protocol formal design and verification means

Selection of two verification tools AVISPA and Isabelle

Verification of the correctness of the entrusting protocol

- Analysis of the entrusting protocol

Tasks



Proof of concepts

- Preliminary discussions about final proof of concept application:
 - Gemalto IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) server platform
 - On line games
 - VoIP
 -

Proof of concepts

- Proof of concept meeting (Trento May 29th 2008):
 - On line gaming application as target
 - Candidate game: car race game
 - Definition of basic requirements: distributed application, DRM, licensing

Conclusions

- All tasks in a healthy state
- Focus during the last year of the project on:
 - Entrusting protocol (T2.5)
 - Proof of concept (T2.6)